The European Union and the Final Status for Kosovo by Toschev, Adrian & Cheikhameguyaz, Gregory
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 80
Issue 1 Symposium: Final Status for Kosovo: Untying
the Gordian Knot
Article 12
December 2004
The European Union and the Final Status for
Kosovo
Adrian Toschev
Gregory Cheikhameguyaz
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Adrian Toschev & Gregory Cheikhameguyaz, The European Union and the Final Status for Kosovo, 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 273 (2005).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol80/iss1/12
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE FINAL STATUS FOR KOSOVO
ADRIAN TOSCHEV* AND GREGORY CHEIKHAMEGUYAZ**
INTRODUCTION
The European Union's ("EU") position on the final status of Kosovo
would have remained vague and secretive had it not been for the March
2004 unrests in Kosovo. The events of March 17 and 18, 2004, are likely to
shake up and clarify the determination of the EU position. The reactions of
the EU institutions in response to the unrests vary. It seems as if the unrests
were the starting point for a new discussion within the EU about Kosovo.
Kosovo still matters for the international community. Determination
of the final status for Kosovo is crucial for regional stability in the Balkans,
including the prevention of terrorism and organized crime. Kosovo has
potential for democratic governance in a largely Muslim context and would
serve as an example for other regions in the world. The final status of Kos-
ovo will affect issues such as the viability and cohesion of the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization ("NATO"); the credibility of the United Nations
and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe ("OSCE");
the future avoidance and alleviation of humanitarian disasters; and the rela-
tions between Europe, the United States, and Russia.' All of this makes
Kosovo important to Europe. But what makes Europe important to
Kosovo?
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This paper examines the EU position on the final status of Kosovo.
Part I describes the importance of the EU for the final status determination,
citing concrete reasons for EU involvement. Part II deals with the current
EU policy towards Kosovo -- "Standards before Status." Part III analyzes
the prospective policy of the EU by taking into account the EU foreign
policy structure and by reviewing different statuses from an EU perspec-
tive. Part IV examines the national positions of four EU member states-
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Greece. Finally, part V ex-
plains the methods the EU could use to influence final status determination.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EU FOR THE FINAL STATUS FOR Kosovo
Analyzing the position of the EU on the final status for Kosovo might
seem important and unnecessary at the same time. One might argue that it
is important because the EU generally plays an important role in political
and economic world affairs. 2 Thus, its support for a final status will be
needed in a region that is so close to some of the Union's member states
that one could drive there comfortably. The mere fact that Kosovo and the
Balkans are so close might inevitably require the examination of the EU
position. On the other hand, it seems unnecessary to analyze the EU posi-
tion because the EU does not have any power to impose a solution. It will
have to accept whatever solution on which Serbia and Kosovo agree. Some
believe that the United States will play the decisive role in bringing the
Kosovar and Serbian side together. Therefore, it could be argued that one
should focus on U.S., rather than European, policy.
All these considerations might well be true. They represent, however,
only general thoughts about the EU. It is important to analyze the position
of the EU for five specific reasons.
First, the EU is geopolitically the closest entity to the Balkans. That
territorial proximity creates political and economic ties. Complex problems
in Kosovo such as political and economic instability, refugees, military
conflict, and organized crime have an impact on other European nations
2. As of May 1,2004, the EU included twenty-five member states: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. European Commission, The History of the European Union, at
http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/history/index-en.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2004). The EU is the biggest
trading bloc in the world, representing 450 million people and producing a quarter of the world's Gross
National Product. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD: EUROPEAN
SECURITY STRATEGY 1, 1 (Dec. 12, 2003) [hereinafter EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY], available at
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.
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that causes them to pay attention to Kosovo. 3 Resolving the final status for
Kosovo will just be the first step in resolving a number of problems that the
Union faces with regard to Kosovo. Therefore, in order to deal with issues
such as economic development, refugees, and crime, European countries
will try to be involved in a final status determination. In addition, Europe
certainly does not want the recurrence of war in the Balkan region. There-
fore, it will try to promote a durable solution to the conflict.
Second, the EU, already an economic heavyweight, has aspirations to
become a political and military global player as well.4 These aspirations
will not be realized if the EU cannot even solve problems in its own back-
yard. It is hard to imagine taking the EU seriously on political and eco-
nomic issues regarding Afghanistan and the Middle East if no coherent EU
policy on problems within Europe exists. Successfully addressing the prob-
lem of final status for Kosovo might prove the capacity of the EU to act as
a global player and allow it to begin to influence other situations.
Third, the EU can influence development in the region through pro-
spective EU membership. The possibility of EU membership can act as an
incentive for political progress. As will be examined below, the incentive
of prospective EU membership remains valid even though the mechanism
may appear to have failed in the case of Cyprus. 5 It is the declared goal of
the EU to integrate the countries of the Western Balkans into the EU struc-
tures through its Stabilization and Association Process ("SAP"). 6 The Un-
ion clearly has an interest in the future integration of the region.
3. Mr. Harm Holkeri, the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General in Kosovo, in a
briefing to the U.N. Security Council on the situation in Kosovo on February 6, 2004, said about Kos-
ovo: "It's a smuggling route, a trafficking route, for everything... money, people, cars." Betsy Pisik,
U.N. Report: Kosovo Laws Updated, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2004, available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/world/20040208-105646-6639r.htm.
4. As part of these efforts, the EU is trying to strengthen its global security policy. On December
12, 2003, the European Council adopted a new Security Strategy aiming to better face problems such as
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime.
EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 3-4. In the report, the EU declared that it needs to be
more capable to face these threats- Id- at 11-14. In order to achieve that goal, the EU took concrete
steps such as the plan for the development of rapidly deployable battle groups by 2007, the creation of a
Defense Agency, and the establishment of an EU cell in NATO. European Commission, Summary of
the Remarks by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(Apr. 5-6, 2004), at the Informal Meeting of Defence Ministers, available at
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cmsData/docs/press-data/EN/dis-cours/79815.pdf.
5. On April 24, 2004, the northern and southern parts of Cyprus voted on a referendum for
reunification, which was rejected by the Greek-dominated South. Cyprus 'Spurns Historic Chance',
BBC NEWS, Apr. 25, 2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/3656753-stm. Conse-
quently, EU law and benefits will only apply to the southern part. i. The original incentive for the
South to gain EU membership apparently did not work, as it was clear that the South would join the EU
in any case, independently of the outcome of the referendum.
6. The SAP is "designed to encourage and support the domestic reform processes" in the coun-
tries of southeastern Europe. European Commission, The EU's Relations with South Eastern Europe, at
2005]
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Fourth, the EU already has a vital role in the economic reconstruction
of Kosovo. The EU is the single largest donor to the reconstruction proc-
ess. 7 Through the SAP, Kosovo and the region enjoy trade preferences. 8
Most importantly, the EU leads the United Nations Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo ("UNMIK") Pillar IV, making it responsible for Recon-
struction and Economic Development. 9 All this makes Kosovo economi-
cally dependent on the EU. This economic relationship gives the EU
political say in the determination of final status.
Fifth, the EU includes two permanent Security Council members: the
United Kingdom and France. Because the current status of Kosovo has
been created by a Security Council resolution, each new status determina-
tion will require a new Council resolution. 10 Necessarily, the vote of France
and the United Kingdom will be required. The treaty establishing the EU
obliges the EU member states to coordinate their vote at the Security
Council in accordance with EU policy. I In practice, however, that does not
really seem to happen. The obligation also is not enforceable through the
European Court of Justice. 12 Recent events, such as the war in Iraq, have
shown that this obligation could be nothing more than a theoretical con-
struct.1 3 However, it is far from clear that the EU member states will not
http://www.europa.eu.int/cormnexternalrelations/see/index.htm (last updated Oct. 2003). It is based
on "aid, trade preferences, dialogue, technical advice and, ultimately, contractual relations." Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. UNMIK, UNMIK at a Glance, at http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.htm (last visited Oct. 15,
2004).
10. The current UNMIK administration of Kosovo was established by Security Council Resolu-
tion 1244. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg. 5, 6, 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES11244
(1999).
11. Article 19 of the EU Treaty says:
(1) Member States shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at intema-
tional conferences. They shall uphold the common position in such forums.... (2) ....
Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert
and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the
positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the
provisions of the United Nations Charter.
CONSOLIDATED VERSIONS OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION AND OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. (C325) 17 (2003), available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/C-2002-325EN.00050 I.html#anArtl I (last visited Oct.
15, 2004).
12. DR. KLAUS-DIETER BORCHARDT, EUROPEAN CoMMIssION, THE ABC OF COMMUNITY LAW
21 (5th ed. 2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lv/about/abc-en.pdf.
13. In March 2003 the U.N. Security Council was deeply divided on the issue of the use of force
against Iraq, with EU member states finding themselves on both sides of the issue. Felicity Barringer,
U.N. Split Widens as Allies Dismiss Deadline on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2003, at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/07/international/middleeast/07CNDIRAQ.html?ex = 1084248000&en
=9ceeec0cl 5dal24af&ei=5070.
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coordinate their action-even at the U.N. Security Council-in the case of
Kosovo. As will be argued below, Kosovo is not an issue so controversial
as to split the EU member states. Therefore, there will not be an open divi-
sion among the EU member states over the issue of Kosovo; rather, the EU
is likely to craft a common position on Kosovo.
Certainly, the EU is not able to impose any solution on the final status
problem. But neither is the United States. The international community will
likely be glad to accept any outcome on which the Serb and Kosovar sides
could agree. As it is far from clear, however, that such an agreement is
possible, all participants will have their own perceptions of the future of
Kosovo. For the named reasons, it is worthwhile to analyze the EU position
on the final status of Kosovo.
1I. THE CURRENT EU POSITION REGARDING THE FINAL STATUS OF
Kosovo
A. The Current EU Involvement in Kosovo
The current EU involvement in Kosovo is mostly economic. The EU
leads Pillar IV of UNMIK, Reconstruction and Economic Development. 14
Within this framework, the EU has launched the Stabilization and Associa-
tion Process, a roadmap to help the countries of the Western Balkans reach
a European standard of economic infrastructures, which is a necessary step
for accession to the EU. 15 Since the SAP is for nation-states only, the EU
launched a special SAP Tracking Mechanism for Kosovo in 2003.16 The
limited role of the EU with respect to economic reconstruction can be ex-
plained as follows.
First, the more political Pillar III of UNMIK, Democratization and
Institution Building, is led by the OSCE. 17 It seems that the EU does not
have any direct involvement in the political reconstruction of Kosovo be-
cause most of its members are NATO allies that participated in the 1999
bombing of Yugoslavia. The more neutral OSCE, in contrast, is made up of
fifty-five members, including Russia, the United States, and almost all the
14. UNMIK, supra note 9.
15. European Commission, supra note 6.
16. The SAP Tracking Mechanism ("STM") for Kosovo, in the framework of the EU's Stabiliza-
tion and Association Process, is a technical working group and is co-chaired by UNMIK, the Provi-
sional Institutions for Self-Government, and the European Commission. Its purpose is to support
Kosovo, through policy advice and guidance, in its EU-compatible structural reforms. Press Release,
European Union Pillar of UNMIK, Inaugural Meeting of the EU's Kosovo SAP Tracking Mechanism
(Mar. 12, 2003), available at http://www.euinkosovo.org/press/2003/pr12032003.html.
17. UNMIK,supra note 9.
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European countries.1 8 Second, any prospective EU membership requires
economic improvement prior to a political integration.
Consequently, one might suppose that the limited role that the EU as-
sumed over the last five years will lead to a limited political involvement in
the future. However, the opposite is true. The limited role of the EU is
likely to end. The main reasons cited for an increasing interest and role of
the EU in Kosovo are (1) the EU is the closest geopolitical entity; (2) the
EU has aspirations to become a global player; (3) the possibility of an EU
membership for Kosovo; (4) the economic weight the EU exerts in the
region; and (5) two EU member states are permanent Security Council
members. In addition, UNMIK has been mandated to oversee Kosovo until
the final status question has been solved. As soon as the final status ques-
tion is on the agenda of the international community and serious determina-
tions must be made, the EU and its member states are going to give up their
political modesty. For the determination of the final status for Kosovo, the
EU will be one of the main actors.
B. "Standards before Status"
The "Standards before Status" policy was proposed by the United Na-
tions and has been traditionally backed by the United States.19 The "Stan-
dards before Status" policy requires that Kosovo meet a certain level of
political and economic standards before a decision regarding its final status
can be made.2 0
UNMIK and the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
("PISG") elaborated on the policy. On December 10, 2003, UNMIK pre-
sented the "Standards for Kosovo," an extensive and detailed outline of the
requirements that must be met before the question of Kosovo's future status
is addressed.2 1 This document was complemented by the Standards Imple-
mentation Plan in March 2004, and an evaluation of progress is scheduled
for mid-2005. 22 The Standards, according to UNMIK, are designed to en-
sure that all people in Kosovo, "regardless of ethnic background, race or
18. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, General Information, at
http://www.osce.org/general/participating-states/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
19. U.S. Embassy, U.S. Welcomes UNMIK's "'Standards for Kosovo" (Dec. 11, 2003), at
http://www.usemb-assy.it/file2003_l2/alia/a3121206.htm.
20. Id.
21. U.S. Embassy, UNMIK Presents Standards/or Kosovo (Dec. 10, 2003), at http://www usemb-
assy.it/file2003_l2/aliala3l2l2O9.htm.
22. U.S. Embassy, supra note 19.
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religion-are free to live, work and travel without fear, hostility or danger
and where there is tolerance, justice and peace for everyone. '23
The Standards cover eight broad categories of democratisation and
"include requirements for functioning democratic institutions, rule of law,
freedom of movement, sustainable returns and rights of communities, mar-
ket economy, property rights, political dialogue, and development of a
civilian Kosovo Protection Corps." '24
The U.N. Secretary-General's Special Representative for Kosovo
("SGSR"), at the time Harri Holkeri (now Soren Jessen-Petersen), was
responsible for transforming these eight categories-first set out in April
2002-into specific and measurable steps Kosovo must achieve. 25
The eight categories are:
1. Functioning Democratic Institutions. This standard, among
other things, requires that elections include intemally-
displaced persons and refugees, that the PISG act without dis-
crimination, and that the media provide information for all
communities in Kosovo.
2. Rule of Law. This standard provides that there should be
equal access to justice and effective prosecution of ethnic
crimes and economic crimes, such as money laundering.
3. Freedom of Movement. This standard requires, among other
things, the free use of language.
4. Sustainable Returns and the Rights of Communities and
Their Members. This standard requires the protection of mi-
nority rights in compliance with European standards.
5. Market Economy. This standard deals with privatization of
socially owned enterprises and tax systems.
6. Property Rights. This standard requires adherence to the
Housing and Property Directorate, and addresses issues in ag-
ricultural property and preservation of the cultural heritage.
7. Political Dialogue. This standard requires constructive and
continuing dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade.
8. Development of the Kosovo Protection Corps. The Corps
mandate is stated as "a civilian emergency organization,
which carries out in Kosovo rapid disaster response tasks for
23. U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, Standards for Kosovo, UNMIK/PR/1078
(Dec. 10, 2003), at http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2003/pressr/prl078.pdf
24. U.S. Embassy, supra note 19.
25. U.S. Embassy, supra note 21.
2005l
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public safety in times of emergency and humanitarian
assistance." 26
Unlike the United States, the position of the EU regarding the "Stan-
dards before Status" doctrine is not uniform. There seemed to be an early
split between the European Parliament and the two other main institutions:
the Commission and the Council.
Since 2002, Joost Lagendijk, a member of the European Parliament
from the Netherlands, affiliated with the Greens, has been trying to get the
issue of Kosovo's final status on the agenda of the European Parliament 27
He described "the need to gain an insight into what will be the future of
Kosovo." 28 He continued:
We cannot have the situation where Kosovo continues to exist whilst the
Kosovans [sic] want something else, but we just hang onto the 1999
U.N. resolution. I do not have the solution, I do not know whether I am
for independence or self-reliance, but I think that it is up to the European
Union to start the discussion.29
On November 19, 2003, Lagendijk made a proposal in which he partly
broke ranks with the traditionally EU-backed "Standards before Status"
policy towards Kosovo by arguing that the status of the ex-Yugoslav prov-
ince should be decided within two years. 30
It is the EU's responsibility to take the lead to ensure that within a period
of-as far as I am concerned-two years, there is clarity with regard to
Kosovo's final status. It is quite clear to me that this will be a difficult
choice. I also think that the European Union need not make that choice
yet, but the Kosovars do need to know that a decision will be taken on
their status in two years' time. I therefore have a double message to give
to the Kosovars: we are prepared to give you clarity about your final
status in two years' time, but you have to prove to us that you are able to
manage your country in a proper manner, that is to say in a manner that
embraces a decent minorities policy, including respect for the borders as
they currently stand. If the Kosovars are able to do this, I think that we
should say that in two years' time, we are prepared to take a decision on
their final status. 3 1
26. For details about the eight Standards see UNMIK/PR/1078.
27. E-mail interview with Ute Seela, at the time of making the statement, Policy Advisor on
Foreign Affairs and Enlargement for the Dutch Green Party (Apr. 28, 2004).
28. Remarks of Lagendijk (Nov. 6, 2002) (Debates of European Parliament), available at
http://www3.europarl.eu.int/omk/omnsapir.so/debatsL5?FILE=20021106EN&LANGUE=EN&LEVEL
=DOC&NUMINT=3-174.
29- Id.
30. Remarks of Lagendijk (Nov. 19, 2003) (Debates of European Parliament), available at
http://www3.europarl.eu.intomk/omnsapir.so/debatsL5?FILE=20031119EN&LANGUE=EN&LEVEL
=TOC 1.
31. Id.
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This proposal has been supported by a majority of the European
Parliament.
The European Council confirmed its support for the "Standards before
Status" doctrine during the EU-Western Balkans summit in Thessaloniki,
Greece, which was held June 19-21, 2003. This was the last official deter-
mination of the EU position. The summit revealed the willingness of both
the EU and the countries of the Western Balkans to move toward European
integration.
For that purpose, concrete measures have been articulated in The
Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans.32 The agenda confirmed the
SAP as a means of consolidating peace and promoting stability and democ-
ratic development. 33 It endowed the SAP with new tools to further Euro-
pean integration. 34 Examples of those tools are Parliamentary Cooperation,
European Partnerships, Opening of Community Programs, and Enhanced
Community Financial Support. 35
The promotion of economic development is still on the agenda be-
cause economic prosperity is essential for long-term stability in the region.
The agenda supported the "Standards before Status" policy as a method for
establishing the final status of Kosovo. 36
III. THE PROSPECTIVE EU POLICY FOR THE FINAL STATUS OF Kosovo
A. The March 2004 Unrests
The March unrests in Kosovo widened the split that had been develop-
ing since 2002 among the EU institutions. The Commission's position is
represented by Chris Patten, the EU Commissioner for External Relations.
In a speech before the European Parliament on March 30, 2004, Patten
described his visit to Kosovo and called for an examination of the events. 37
He did not, however, indicate any change in the Commission's position on
the final status of Kosovo, but remained loyal to the "Standards before
32. European Commission, General Affairs & External Relations Council, The Thessaloniki
Agenda for the Western Balkans (June 16, 2003), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ex-
ternalrelations/see/gacthess.htm.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. European Commission, Speech by the Rt. Hon. Chris Patten, CH before the Plenary European
Parliament (Mar. 30, 2004), at http://europa.eu.int/comn-/extemal relations/news/pat-
tern/sp04_166.htm.
20051
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Status" policy.38 He said that "[f]inal status discussions are for another
day."' 39 Patten also stated, "[I do not] believe that we should abandon the
idea of 'Standards before Status.' On the other hand, I don't think that we
should send a signal that final status discussion will be delayed
indefinitely." 40
The positions of European Council members, as well as Javier Solana,
the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy,
have been similar.4 1 There are no indications that any new approach will be
followed or is seen as necessary. The "Standard before Status" policy re-
mains the basic line:
[The] Council and European Commission have always expressed their
support for the U.N.-line: Standards before Status. The riots in March
have strengthened the will of both institutions not to let themselves be
blackmailed into a shift of policy. There is no official policy change to
be expected within the near future. 42
In a recent debate in the European Parliament concerning the situation in
Kosovo, Mr. Roche from the Council said, "I would like to underscore the
strong support of the European Union for the United Nations policy of
Standards before Status. This policy, together with Security Council Reso-
lution 1244, remains the foundation of the international community's
commitment to Kosovo." 43
Again, the most outspoken institution regarding a change in the EU
policy has been the European Parliament. In its session on March 30, 2004,
Doris Pack, member of the European Parliament and head of the delegation
for Southeast Europe of the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee, called for a change in the "Standards before Status" policy.44 She said
the current approach was not satisfactory and needed to be changed: "I do
not believe that 'Standards before Status' is the only way; so far, it has led
us astray. It should be 'Standards and Status'. We must now set about
solving the questions of status." 4 5 She emphasized that without a clear per-
38. Id.
39 Id.
40. Id.
41. Irish Presidency 2004 of the European Union, Statement by Minister ofState Roche, on Behalf
of the Council of Ministers, to the European Parliament on Kosovo (Mar. 30, 2004), at
http://www.eu2004.ie/temp-lates/news.asp?sNavlocator-66&list-id=484.
42. E-mail interview with Ute Seela, supra note 27.
43. Remarks of Roche (Mar. 30, 2004) (Debates of European Parliament), available at
http://www3.europarl .eu.int/omk/omnsapir.so/cre?APP=CRE&PRG=CALEND&FILE=20040330r&L
ANGUE=EN&LEVEL=TOCI&CRENEW=04-03-30&LEG=L5.
44. Remarks of Pack (Mar. 30, 2004) (Debates of European Parliament), available at
http://www3.europarl.eu.int/omk/omnsapir.so/creAPP=CRE&PRG=CALEND&FILE=20040330r&L
ANGUE=EN&LEVEL=TOCI&CRENEW=04-03-30&LEG=L5.
45. Id. (emphasis added).
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ception as to where Kosovo is going, there will be ongoing unrest. 46 First,
the U.N. must transfer more power to local Kosovar authorities, and Bel-
grade must be prevented from establishing parallel structures in Kosovo for
the Serb minority.4 7 Arguably, parallel governmental structures lead to the
alienation and not integration of the Serb minority. Pack also said that the
resistance of both sides, Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, to creating a multi-
ethnic entity or state needs to face consequences set by the EU. 48 She urged
the European Council to determine a new approach for the EU regarding
Kosovo.49 Finally, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on April
1, 2004, regarding the situation in Kosovo. 50 The resolution asks the Euro-
pean Council to begin a debate on the final status of Kosovo in a way that
implies the determination of precise deadlines.5 1
Consequently, the split between the EU institutions that had started to
occur in 2002 deepened with the March 2004 unrests. What that split
means depends on the weight each institution carries. This is determined by
the allocation of power among the different EU institutions regarding for-
eign policy.
B. The Power Structure Within the EU Regarding Foreign Policy
In order to determine whether and how the EU position on the final
status will change, one must examine which institutions determine and
carry out the EU's foreign policy. Understanding the respective roles of
different institutions regarding the EU foreign policy helps determine
which EU institution is the decisive one.
The EU's foreign policy is called the Common Foreign and Security
Policy ("CFSP").5 2 The CFSP comprises the so-called second Pillar of the
EU. 53 It was established by the 1993 Maastricht Treaty on the EU and
amended by the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 and the Nice Treaty of 2001. 54
The principles and general guidelines for the CFSP are made by the Euro-
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution on the Situation in Kosovo (Apr. 1,
2004), available at http://www3.europarl.eu.int/omk/omnsapir.so/pv2?PRG=CALDOC&FILE=20040-
401&LANGUE=EN&TPV=PROV&LASTCHAP=33&SDOCTA=25&TXTLST=I &TypeDoc=FIRS
T&POS=I.
51. Id. 12.
52. European Commission, Common Foreign and Security Policy, available at http://eu-
ropa'eu.int/comm/external relations/cfsp/intro/indexhtm (last updated Feb. 2002).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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pean Council, which is composed of the heads of the member states and the
President of the European Commission. 55 There are "common strategies"
that set out the overall policy guidelines for activities by individual coun-
tries. So far there are "common strategies" on Russia, the Ukraine, the
Mediterranean, and the Middle East Peace Process. 56 There are also "com-
mon positions," which commit member states to adopting a certain position
and a certain course of action, and which are decided by the General Af-
fairs Council (composed of the foreign ministers of the member states and
the Commission External Relations Commissioner).57 Within the CFSP,
special representatives for a certain region or country can be appointed who
are accountable to the European Council.58
The CFSP has to be seen as part of the wider EU structure. The first
Pillar concerns so-called "Community matters." 59 The second Pillar con-
sists of the CFSP, and the third Pillar consists of the Police and Justice
Cooperation.60 Within all these Pillars, the European institutions assume
different powers depending on the sphere in which they are acting. The
most integrated Pillar is the first Pillar. 61 The legal nature of the first Pillar
is supranational, meaning that the European institutions above the national
level can make binding and enforceable decisions. 62 Therefore the Com-
mission, the Parliament, and the Council of Ministers enjoy the most power
in the first Pillar because their powers are the broadest and most independ-
ent from the national level. The second and third Pillars are of intergov-
ernmental nature, which means that decisions are made on the basis of
cooperation among the member states. 63 Therefore, the legal instruments of
the EU do not apply directly to the member states and cannot be reviewed
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. id. The Council of the EU (Council of Ministers) is the main decision-making body of the EU.
Meetings are held by the ministers of each member state (in contrast to the European Council which
meets at the level of heads of state) depending on the specific issue. That means that depending on the
agenda the council meets in different "configurations." For foreign policy issues the council convenes
as the General Affairs and External Relations Council (also called the General Affairs Council). Coun-
cil of the European Union, Council Configurations, at http://ue.eu.int/cms3-fo/show-
Page.asp?id=427&lang-en&mode=g (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
58. European Commission, supra note 52.
59. See BORCHARDT, supra note 12, at 18. The first Pillar is made up of the European Communi-
ties: the European Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, and Euratom. Id. At the heart
of the Pillar is the Single Market with certain basic freedoms like the free movement of goods. Id- at 20.
60. Id. at 20-21.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 25. "The first Pillar embodies Community jurisdiction in its most highly developed
form." Id. at 20. Within the framework of the EC, the Community institutions may draw up legislation
in their respective areas of responsibility which applies directly in the member states and may claim
precedence over national law. See id. at 27-28.
63. Id. at 29.
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by the European Court of Justice.64 This is a crucial distinction, as it gives
the second Pillar a more international character. The European Council and
the General Affairs Council enjoy the most power. Agreements enjoy the
status of international treaties or international executive agreements but do
not supersede national law or policy.65 The question of the final status of
Kosovo clearly falls within the second Pillar, the CFSP.
The structure of the EU and the legal nature of its different Pillars are
important in order to understand the decision-making process within the
EU. The European Council and the General Affairs Council are the most
powerful organs in the CFSP. "The Commission may, as any Member
State, refer to the Council any question relating to CFSP and may submit
proposals to the Council-although it does not have the sole right to do so
as in Community matters. ' 66 The Commission is solely responsible for
many other external policies of the EU such as trade, humanitarian aid,
development assistance, rehabilitation and reconstruction, and sanctions
regulations. 67 In matters of foreign policy, however, the Commission only
enjoys a minor role.
In the Community sphere, external representation is the function of
Commission delegations. 68 In the CFSP sphere, the representation function
is performed by the Presidency of the Council, operating through the local
ambassador of the country holding the Presidency. 69 Usually a so-called
Troika is formed, consisting of the representatives of the current presi-
dency, the future presidency and the Commission.70 The Troika represents
the CFSP policy to third countries. 71 The decisions, however, are made by
the European Council. They are carried out by the General Affairs Council.
According to the European Commission,
The Presidency of the Council plays a vital part in the organisation of the
work of the institution, notably as the driving force in the legislative and
political decision-making process. It organizes and chairs all meetings
and works out compromises capable of resolving difficulties. This is a
key role in CFSP where decisions are taken by unanimity.72
64. Id. at 21.
65. See id. at 24.
66. European Commission, supra note 52.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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The Presidency is assisted by the Council Secretariat and, since the Treaty
of Amsterdam, the Secretary-General/High Representative for the CFSP,
currently Javier Solana. According to Article 26 of the EU treaty:
[The High Representative] shall assist the Council in matters coming
within the scope of the CFSP, in particular through contributing to the
formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and,
when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of
the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third
countries. 73
Thus, the High Representative has only an assisting role. Nor does the
European Parliament have direct legal power in the CFSP. 74 It is merely
kept regularly informed and consulted on the broad orientation and choices
in this area. 75 The European Parliament, however, has budgetary authority
and thereby attempts to implement its political agenda. The European Par-
liament can veto the budget, which includes the financial means of the EU
for the Western Balkans. 76 The budget does not come into force until it has
been signed by the President of Parliament. 77 Therefore, the European
Commission, the European Parliament, and the High Representative only
have assisting roles in EU foreign policymaking. The main bodies in
charge are the European Council and the General Affairs Council, both
representing the national governments. Consequently, the calls of the Euro-
pean Parliament for a change in the "Standards before Status" policy are
nothing more than pleas to the European Council. The real power lies in the
hands of the national governments represented in the Council. Therefore,
decision making regarding the EU position on Kosovo will not take place
among EU bureaucrats, but rather through the national executives. The
heads of state and foreign ministers will be the driving force for the deter-
mination of the EU position on the final status. National interests and poli-
tics will play a role.
The question is then whether the national governments will be able to
agree on a common position in the European Council. The example of the
war in Iraq might not offer much hope for unanimous decisions on foreign
policy matters. 78 Legally, the CFSP-through the treaty on the EU-
obligates the member states to try to reach a common foreign policy. 79
73. Id-
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See European Parliament, Powers of the European Parliament (Apr. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.europarl.eu.int/presentation/default-en.htm#powers.
77. ld.
78. See Barringer, supra note 13.
79. Article 11(2) of the Treaty on the EU states:
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However, this obligation is not enforceable. 80 The enforcer of compliance
is the Council, and thus the member states themselves. 81 It is, however,
likely that there will be no split among the EU member states on the final
status for Kosovo, but that a common position will be determined within
the CFSP. The reasons are effectively the same for why the EU has an in-
terest in the region and why it is important to analyze its position: the aspi-
rations of the EU to be a global political and military player, the economic
aid and development assistance it has provided to Kosovo, and the prospect
of the accession of the Western Balkan countries to the EU in the future. It
is a question of what weighs more-these reasons or national politics? In
the case of the war in Iraq, national politics were more important than the
unity of the EU in foreign policy matters. The case of Kosovo is different,
though.
There are a number of reasons why there will be no split among EU
member states on the issue of Kosovo. First, contrary to the war in Iraq, it
is unlikely that a major split will emerge between the United States and
some European countries. Both the United States and Europe carried out
the military action through NATO in 1999. Both have worked together in
Kosovo for about five years-politically, economically, and militarily.
There might be different perceptions and visions about the future of Kos-
ovo. They are, however, not too far apart. Most importantly, both the
United States and Europe would rather put pressure on the Kosovar and the
Serb side to come to an agreement than to create their own solution. It is
therefore likely that the United States and Europe are going to work to-
gether. Thus, the United Kingdom as well as other European countries will
not feel politically compelled to decide between the United States and fel-
low EU member states.
Second, military action in Kosovo already occurred in 1999. The split
within the EU regarding the war in Iraq was based in part on the issue
whether the use of force was permissible. That critical moment has already
The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unre-
servedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. The Member States shall work together to
enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action
which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohe-
sive force in international relations. The Council shall ensure that these principles are com-
plied with.
CONSOLIDATED VERSIONS OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION art, 11(2), available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/C2002325EN.000 0 .html#-anArtl I (last visited Oct.
15, 2004).
80. BORCHARDT, supra note 12, at 21.
81. CONSOLIDATED VERSIONS OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION art. 11(2), available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/ur-lex/en/treaties/dat/C-2002325EN.0005l.html4#-anArtl I (last visited Oct.
15, 2004).
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passed in Kosovo. There is a foreign military presence and no need to de-
cide on military action. Therefore, the final status of Kosovo is not an issue
controversial enough to lead to a split among the EU member states. The
EU member states will overcome potential differences and reach a common
position. The EU member states know that if they disagree amongst each
other on the final status of Kosovo, they will have the same problem down
the road when they have to agree whether to accept the region's countries
into the EU. In addition, the EU generally tries to speak with one voice in
the Western Balkans. The EU and not individual countries leads UNMIK
Pillar IV.82 The EU deployed its first military mission in Macedonia, which
since then has been changed into an EU Police Mission.83 The EU also has
a Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 84 Therefore, the EU will try to
keep speaking with one voice in the region in order to not undermine its
credibility as a united force. The example of an open political split regard-
ing the war in Iraq was the exception rather than the rule in European for-
eign policy. Generally, the member states manage to overcome their
differences and determine a common position.
C. Possible Statuses for Kosovo
After having determined what EU institution within the EU structure
will be decisive for the final status, the question remains: what status will
the EU support? Due to the reiterated support for the "Standard before
Status" policy by the European Council, there are, at this point, no indica-
tions about any preferences the EU might have. However, different options
and their likelihood of being favored by the EU can be analyzed. In evalu-
ating the likelihood of any EU position, the following factors should be
taken into consideration.
First, the prevention of further disintegration of other countries in the
region will be of high priority to the EU. The main issue is not whether the
independence of Kosovo will really lead to more disintegration in Mace-
donia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, but rather that this fear exists among the
EU member states. Therefore any final status solution will be evaluated in
light of how much instability it may cause for Kosovo's neighbors.
82. UNMIK, supra note 9-
83. German Embassy in the United States, EU Military Mission Helped Security in Macedonia
(Dec. 11, 2003), available at http://www.gerrnany-info.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol-cu_macedonia-
2003.htm. In December 2003 the EU Police Mission "Proxima" replaced Operation "Concordia," which
was the first EU military mission ever and went from March through December 2003- Id.
84. European Union Police Mission, A Few of Many Events: Year 2003, at
http://www.eupm.org/activities/seupmia.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2004). The EU Police Mission in
Bosnia and Herzegovina started in January 2003. Id.
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Second, the EU will not accept divisions along ethnic lines. In every
statement of every institution regarding Kosovo, the need for a multiethnic
Kosovo is emphasized. On the occasion of the recent unrest, the European
Council again condemned the "ethnic violence" and called for the com-
mitment of Kosovo's Provisional Institutions of Self-Government to a mul-
tiethnic Kosovo.8 5 Again, the questions of whether ethnic tensions or
dissatisfaction with UNMIK caused the recent unrest and whether a multi-
ethnic Kosovo is a realistic possibility is not the point; the point is that the
EU will support the status that, in its eyes, fulfills this criterion. The ration-
ale behind this factor is that the EU sees itself as a multicultural and multi-
ethnic union, which is demonstrated by its slogan "United in Diversity." 86
Third, there are other political and economic considerations that will
influence an EU position. Certainly, the EU will not allow the money it has
spent in aid and reconstruction to be wasted on new military action, which
could lead to an increased flow of refugees. The public opinion in many
European countries is against further refugees from the Balkans. These
factors need to be taken into account in examining the EU position on dif-
ferent statuses for Kosovo. They determine whether the EU is likely to
favor a certain status. Given these factors, seven potential statuses for Kos-
ovo from an EU perspective should be examined.
1. Complete Reintegration into the Union of Serbia & Montenegro
Although this status appears impossible due to the political situation, it
should be notes here for purposes of completeness.
2. A Continuous Protectorate Under the United Nations
In this scenario, although the U.N. administration is interim by nature,
the current protectorate would remain unchanged; no decision would be
taken regarding a final status, and the United Nations would continue to
oversee Kosovo while Kosovo's autonomy increased.
85. Irish Presidency 2004 of the European Union, supra note 41.
86. European Commission, EU Enlargement, at http://europa.eu.int/eday-en.htm (last visited Oct.
15, 2004). The EU has a strong Human Rights and Democratization Policy that includes the protection
of minorities. In the recent enlargement process, special attention was paid to minority rights. The
Copenhagen Criteria, designed in 1993 for countries wishing to join the EU, specifically highlight the
protection of minorities. The Stability Pact launched in Cologne on June 10, 1999, which aims to
anchor peace and democracy in southeastern Europe, also pays a great deal of attention to the respect
for minorities. See European Commission, The EU's Human Rights and Democratisation Policy,
available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comr/extemal_relations/humanrights/rm/index.htm (last visited
Oct- 15, 2004). The slogan was primarily used in the recent enlargement round. See, e.g., European
Commission, EU Enlargement, supra.
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In terms of regional stability, this status seems questionable given the
March unrest. It would require an increased vigilance by the Kosovo Force
("KFOR") and an extension of the international military presence. The
indefinite postponement of a final status decision might "corrupt" the pro-
gress already achieved if the international community is no longer per-
ceived as a protector but as an occupying entity.87
On an economic level, the lack of decision regarding the final status
would inhibit foreign investments and paralyze economic development.
However, as of today, without intending to blame one party more then
the other, this status seems to provide a better protection of the Serb minor-
ity than the Kosovo government would.
3. Shift of the Protectorate to the EU
Another possibility is to replace the UNMIK as protectorate of Kos-
ovo with an EU protectorate. That means that the EU would be in charge of
all or most of the recent UNMIK Pillars. This solution might ease compli-
ance with EU standards and contribute to a better development of Kosovo.
It might advance the implementation of the SAP in Kosovo, contribute to
more economic aid and development from European countries, enhance
Kosovo's integration into the pan-European infrastructure, and, in the long
run, pave the way for Kosovo's accession into the EU. The main idea be-
hind EUMIK is that it allows both sides to save face. 88 It is based on the
assumption that with all the countries of South Eastern Europe being in the
EU one day, conflicts will ease. Although only nation-states are members
of the EU, Kosovo might be able to join as a EU trusteeship territory and
become independent over time. 89 Thus, political powers that are exercised
by EUMIK will slowly be retransferred to the Kosovar authorities. In con-
sequence, this proposal allows an independent Kosovo by way of EU ac-
cession, an "independence through the backdoor. 90 In addition, the EU
could prove its capacity as a political, economic, and military nation
builder. This option has not been officially mentioned by the EU yet, but it
has gained support on the national level. The German Liberal Party 91 intro-
duced a resolution to the German parliament on March 31, 2004, asking the
87. U.S. INST. OF PEACE, supra note 1, at 1-2.
88. Interview with Brigita Jeroncic, Assistant to Dr. Rainer Stinner, Member of the German
Bundestag (Parliament) (Nov. 13, 2004) (explaining the EUMIK idea). Stinner introduced a resolution
for EUMIK in the German Bundestag.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. F.D.P., Impressum (Aug. 2, 2004), available at http://www.liberale.de/portallindex.-
phtml?impressum=l.
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parliament to vote in favor of an EU protectorate. 9 2 If adopted, the resolu-
tion would legally bind the German government to represent that position
in the European Council.9 3 According to the authors of the proposal, it has
also gained support in Kosovo as a perspective of independence in the long
term. 9
4
A change in the form of protectorate does not, however, eliminate the
dissatisfaction of the local population with the lack of self-governance.
Frustration with UNMIK would transfer to EUMIK.95 The EU will face the
same problems and might not do a better job than UNMIK and the OSCE.
It is not assured that the EU would be more successful than UNMIK. An
EU protectorate would not solve any of the final status questions, but
would only delay the problem. In the end, this might delay the effort of
integrating Serbia and Kosovo into Europe. Only a realistic status solution
with a concrete timetable offers true incentives for political and economic
reforms. The Kosovo side might not be willing to wait any longer. In addi-
tion, the Serbian side might not accept such a change. Under the current
UNMIK administration, any changes require the involvement of the U.N.
Security Council, of which Russia is a permanent member whose vote is
required. The guarantee of the traditionally friendly and supportive Russian
vote would be lost for Serbia. As a result, the EU goals might be better
served if the conflict is solved once and forever instead of installing a new
interim administration.
4. Cantonization/Decentralization
Under this hypothesis, "Serb enclaves govern themselves under de
facto (not necessarily de jure) Yugoslav sovereignty, regardless of Kos-
ovo's status; this is a 'soft' partition scenario."'96
92 Antrag 15/2860 was introduced on March 31, 2004. There has been no vote on the request yet.
Deutscher Bundestag, hib-heute im Bundestag, 094/2004 (Apr. 6, 2004), available at http://www.bund-
estag.detbic/hib/2004/2004_094/02.htrnl. The actual request can be found in German at
http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/1 5/028/1502860.pdf (Mar. 31, 2004).
93. E-mail interview with Brigita Jeroncic, Assistant to Dr. Rainer Stinner, Member of the Ger-
man Bundestag (Parliament) (Apr. 13, 2004). Stinner was in charge of introducing the EUMIK resolu-
tion.
94. Interview with Jeroncic, supra note 88.
95. The name "EUMIK" (EU Mission in Kosovo) has been introduced by the authors due to a lack
of official denomination for such a protectorate at this point.
96. U.S. INST. OF PEACE, supra note 1, at 7. An Institute task force examined options for Kosovo's
final status. Participants in the Task Force included: Kurt Bassuener, Co-Director, Democratization
Policy Institute; Michael Dzeidzic, Program Officer, Balkans Initiative, U.S. Institute of Peace; Jusuf
Fuduli, Research Assistant, Balkans Initiative, U.S. Institute of Peace; Heather Hurlburt, Deputy Direc-
tor, International Crisis Group, Washington Office; James Hooper, Public International Law and Policy
Group; Julie Merrus, American University; Brenda Pearson, Senior Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace;
Robert Perito, Senior Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace; Colette Rausch, Program Officer, Rule of Law
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In terms of regional stability, this status might lead to negative conse-
quences in Macedonia and southern Serbia, where Albanians could ask for
a similar kind of autonomy. Moreover, it would require military presence
for an indefinite amount of time to protect the enclaves, does not lead to a
multiethnic administration of Kosovo, but to a disguised ethnic separation,
and would be very complex to administer.
The positive aspects of this status are its legitimacy (it has the favor of
the Serbs-in Kosovo and in Belgrade as well) 97 and the fact that the re-
gional borders would stay intact, with no further disintegration of the
Balkans.
5. A Loose Federation
Kosovo could be integrated into the Union of Serbia and Montenegro
as an equal third state. This option would offer a middle ground between
the more radical solutions of full independence or reintegration into Serbia.
Kosovo would have a higher degree of self-governance than an autono-
mous province. Also, this solution would avoid any change of borders in
the region.
However, there is one main objection. It is unclear whether the union
between Serbia and Montenegro will last. It was established through the
Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro on February 4, 2003.98
The creation of Serbia and Montenegro formally terminated the state of
Yugoslavia.99 Its long-term existence must be questioned. First, the Consti-
tutional Charter was drafted so as "to placate Montenegro's restive stirrings
for independence and will allow Montenegro to hold a referendum on inde-
pendence in three years' time." 100 In addition, in May 2003, "Filip Vujano-
vic, a strong advocate of Montenegrin independence, was elected
Montenegro's president." 101 On April 4, 2004, he reiterated that Montene-
gro does not benefit from the State Union and called for consideration of
Program, U.S. Institute of Peace; Louis Sell, University of Maine; Gen. John O.B. Sewall (retired);
Daniel Serwer, Director, Balkans Initiative, U.S. Institute of Peace; Paul Szasz, New York University
(participated in task force meetings but died before final report was prepared); Eric Witte, Coalition for
International Justice. Id. at 19.
97. Serbian Unity Congress, Premier Kostunica: For Serbia "Status of Kosovo" Means Many
Things but Under No Circumstances Can it Mean Independence (Mar. 3, 2004), at http://news.serbian-
unity.net/bydate/2004/March_03/20.html.
98. Serbia and Montenegro, Political System, available at http://www.gov.yu/start.phpje=e&id=6
(last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
99. Serbia and Montenegro, History from 1918 to 2003, available at http://www.gov.yu/-
start.php?je-e&id=38 (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
100. Infoplease.com Online Encyclopedia, Serbia and Montenegro, at http://www.info-
please.com/ipa/AD108157.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
101. Id.
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independence for Montenegro. 10 2 Therefore, the option of a loose federa-
tion does not seem very viable.
6. Unconditional Independence Within Existing Borders
This option is defined as follows in a report of the United States Insti-
tute of Peace:
After an agreed period (perhaps three years) of increasing self-rule under
international supervision, Kosovo would become an independent state
within its current borders. Kosovo Serbs would get internationally guar-
anteed rights and broad local autonomy. Before independence, Kosovo
would establish cooperative trans-border political, economic, and secu-
rity relationships with neighboring states. International monitoring would
continue for a limited period after independence. 10 3
Unlike conditional independence, this status likely will not be per-
ceived as legitimate by the international community because it will be con-
sidered an "unearned" independence. Moreover, to be acceptable, this
solution would likely require an effective minority protection, but the
March unrests demonstrate the vulnerability of minorities. It seems that this
status would increase the push for partition.
An independent Kosovo would certainly relieve Serbia from a burden-
some obstacle to obtaining EU membership, but it also raises, in Europe,
the ministates issue. Will the EU be reluctant to accept the creation of
many ministates in Europe, increasing the number of its potential mem-
bers? On one hand, this solution might complicate the political process
with respect to structuring European institutions (for example, voting rights
and the number of commissioners). On the other hand, there is no valid
argument against admitting ministates, considering the admission of Malta
and Cyprus and the membership of Luxemburg.
Considering these observations, one might think that it is preferable to
have democratic ministates than ongoing conflicts. Already, with the May
2004 enlargement of the EU, there seems to exist a trend for the admission
of a larger number of smaller countries. The EU members can be classified
as follows:
* four big countries (Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy);
" two medium/big countries (Spain, Poland);
102. President of the Republic of Montenegro, Statement of April 4, 2004, available at
http://www.pred-sjednik-cg.yu/eng/index.phtml?akcija=vijest&id=311. "If Serbia and Montenegro do
not benefit from the State Union, then it should no longer exist." Id.
103. U.S. INST. OF PEACE, supra note 1, at 11.
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* ten medium/small countries (Romania, Netherlands, Greece,
Czech Republic, Belgium, Hungary, Portugal, Sweden, Bul-
garia, Austria);
* five small countries (Slovakia, Denmark, Finland, Ireland,
Lithuania);
* six ministates (Latvia, Slovenia, Estonia, Cyprus, Luxem-
bourg, Malta).
There clearly is a trend within the EU to accept more ministates. In-
stead of trying to avoid the creation of ministates, the EU might have to
adapt its institutions.
7. Independence After the Rearrangement of Borders
Under this system, the borders between Serbia and Kosovo would be
rearranged according to ethnic composition. Mainly the three northern mu-
nicipalities-Zvecan, Zubin Potok, and Leposavic-as well as Mitrovica
north of the Ibar River, would go to Serbia. 104 The remaining 26.5 munici-
palities would become an independent Kosovo. 105 Albanian-dominated
areas in southern Serbia would become part of an independent Kosovo.
It is arguable whether this option might set a destabilizing precedent
for Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. What is important is that in the
eyes of the EU it will have that effect. The EU already worries about desta-
bilization in the region. During the violence in Macedonia in 2001, the EU
perceived the possibility of a military conflict between the Albanian minor-
ity and the Slavic majority in Macedonia. The EU knows that that violence
was only prevented by quick and decisive action. Additionally, the percep-
tion of the Balkans in general is that territorial conflicts, especially moves
for independence, inevitably lead to military conflicts. The EU certainly is
not willing to take that risk and open Pandora's Box. Finally, changing
borders along ethnic lines will not lead to effective protection of minorities.
There will never be ethnically "clean" areas and therefore no end to the
necessity of minority protection. A monoethnic policy is completely con-
trary to EU policy. Surely any EU support for this option can be ruled out.
IV. NATIONAL POSITIONS ON THE FINAL STATUS OF KOSOvO
It has been determined that the European Council and the General Af-
fairs Council will be the EU institutions that play the major role in the EU's
position on the final status for Kosovo. In the European Council and the
104. Id. at 12.
105. Id.
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General Affairs Council, the national governments are represented. There-
fore, the positions of the national governments need to be determined.
This analysis will include the positions of Germany, France, the
United Kingdom, and Greece. The first three are the biggest and politically
and economically most important countries in the EU. In addition, France
and the United Kingdom have veto power in the U.N. Security Council.
Therefore their agreement to any change of Resolution 1244 will be re-
quired. Greece has been included in the analysis as it is the closest tradi-
tional ally of Serbia in the EU. Analyzing national positions towards the
final status of Kosovo requires taking intranational politics into account.
Intranational political analysis also allows for the formulation of strategies
for influencing an EU position before it has been determined on the Euro-
pean level.
A. Germany
Intra-German politics have already been partly demonstrated by the
resolution of the Liberal Party that was introduced into the German Parlia-
ment on March 31, 2004, asking the Parliament to vote for an EU protec-
torate in Kosovo. 106 There has been no vote on the resolution yet, nor any
scheduled date at this point. The Liberal Party has been an opposition party
since 1998. However, from 1969 to 1998, it was in charge of the Foreign
Ministry, dominating German foreign politics for about twenty years.107
Thus, the resolution carries some political weight. It is far from clear,
though, that it will be adopted. The member of Parliament who was in
charge of drafting the resolution is skeptical about the chances for its adop-
tion. 108 The simple reason is that the governing parties enjoy the majority
in Parliament. 109
The majority parties-the Social Democratic Party and the Green
Party-remain vague about their opinions on the future of Kosovo. There is
no clearly defined policy. The government sticks with the "Standards be-
106. Deutscher Bundestag. supra note 92.
107. FDP Bundestagsfraktion [Website of the Parliamentary Group of the Liberal Party),
Geschichte der Fraktion [History of the Parliamentary Group], Details der einzelnen Wahlperioden
[Details of the Individual Legislative Periods], available at http://www.fdp-fraktion.de/ (last visited
Oct. 15, 2004).
108. E-mail Interview with Jeroncic, supra note 93.
109. In 1998, the Socialdemocratic and the Green Party formed a coalition on the federal level; they
have the majority in Parliament. Der Bundeswahlleiter [Website of the German Electoral Commis-
sioner], Bundestagswahlen [Federal Parliamentary Elections] (Oct. 30, 2002), at
http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/wahlen/btwahl.htm.
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fore Status" policy. I10 Given the recent unrest in Kosovo, the U.N. Security
Council in a session on March 18, 2004, discussed the situation in Kos-
ovo.111 The Security Council adopted a declaration condemning the vio-
lence and calling for an investigation of the events. 1 12 The declaration does
not have the legal status of an international resolution. "13 The German for-
eign minister, Joschka Fischer (Green Party), who was present at the U.N.
meeting, allegedly acknowledged in private that independence is no option
at this point. 114 This position reflects intra-German politics to the extent
that the foreign minister represents the government and--due to the par-
liamentary system in Germany-the majority in Parliament. The statement,
however, is only reported to have been made and was neither made in pub-
lic nor officially affirmed. It therefore is not based on an official determina-
tion of the German position, which remains the "Standards before Status"
approach. The Security Council declaration also does not reflect an official
German position because it condemned the March 2004 unrest but did not
deal with the status of Kosovo.
Both perspectives make clear that short-term independence of Kosovo
is not a valid option according to Germany. While one of the opposition
parties favors an EU protectorate, the government does not seem to have a
clear perception of Kosovo's future status at all. Both, however, imply that
independence is not favored at this point. Therefore, Germany most likely
will not support immediate independence for Kosovo.
B. France
France, since its alliance with Serbia during World War I, traditionally
maintains closer relations with Serbia than with Albania. On November 5,
1998, "[a] French army officer [was suspected] of passing NATO secrets to
Belgrade.,,115 The U.S. military also suspected France of pro-Serbian sym-
pathies in the Balkan conflict. In response to these allegations, the former
110. Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations, Statement by Mr. Joschka Fischer
Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the United Nations Security Council Meeting in New York on
March 18, 2004. on the Situation in Kosovo (Mar. 18, 2004), available at http://www.germany-
info.orgIUN/archive/speeches/2004/sp_03_18_04.html.
111. Phoenix Online, UNO Fordert Ende der Gewalt im Kosovo [U.N. Demands End of Violence in
Kosovo] (Mar. 19, 2004), at http://www.phoenix.de/ereig/exp/1 9360/.
112. Deutsche Welle , NATO Peacekeepers in Action in Kosovo (Mar. 20, 2004), available at
http://www.dw-world.de/english/0,3367,1433_A_ 147147_lA,00.html; Phoenix Online, supra note
Ill.
113. Phoenix Online, supra note 111.
114. Der Standard, Svilanovic: Deutschland "'blockiert" Kosovo-Resolution [Germany Blocks a
Kosovo Resolution] (Mar. 26, 2004), available at http://derstandard.at/?id= 1612302.
115. Reuters, Media: Alleged Spy Reveals Damaging Information to Serbia (Nov. 5, 1998), avail-
able at http://www.xs4all.nl,-,pressnow/media/kosovo/981105.html.
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French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin denied a biased French policy:
"French policy in Yugoslavia is perfectly clear ... It is not decided by feel-
ings for this or against that."' 116
During the earliest stages of the Kosovo conflict, France encouraged
political settlement of the issue through the establishment of a status of
substantial autonomy inside the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 1 7 Presi-
dent Chirac formally opened the Rambouillet meeting. 118 The conference
was held under Franco-British co-chairmanship. They recorded the parties'
agreement in principle on the political framework for the substantial auton-
omy of Kosovo and decided to convene a meeting to finalize the agree-
ment, including its implementation chapter. The Rambouillet Accords were
actually signed by the Kosovar delegation alone. Nowadays, France, still
governed by the Chirac administration, seems to pursue a similar and con-
sistent policy. Bernard Kouchner's appointment as the U.N. Secretary-
General's special representative ensured that France would play a key role
in the administration and reconstruction of Kosovo. 119
The current official position of the French Republic is manifested by
ongoing support for the "Standards before Status" doctrine. Although there
was no apparent shift in the French policy after the March 2004 unrests,
one must still be aware that two different inclinations can be found among
French politicians. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, at the time a French member of the
European Parliament, 120 affiliated with the Greens, opposes the partition of
Kosovo and appears to be pro-Albanian.121 On the other hand, Bruno Goll-
nisch, French member of the European Parliament, nonaffiliated, Front
116. Id.
117. JoMarie Fecci, French Policy in Kosovo, PARIS TEMPO, available at www.paris-
tempo.com/kosovo3.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
118. See Richard Becker, The Rambouillet Accord: A Declaration of War Disguised as a Peace
Agreement, available at http://www.iacenter.org/warcrime/rbecker.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
The accord provided for a very broad form of autonomy for Kosovo. A province of Serbia,
one of two republics (along with Montenegro) which make up present-day Yugoslavia, Kos-
ovo would have its own parliament, president, prime minister, supreme court and security
forces under Rambouillet. The new Kosovo government would be able to negate laws of the
federal republic's legislature (unlike U.S. states) and conduct its own foreign policy.
Id.
119. Fecci, supra note 117.
120. As of the last European Parliament elections on June 13, 2004, Mr. Cohn-Bendit has since
become a German Member of the European Parliament. European Green Party, Green Group in the
European Parliament, available at http://www.europeangreens-org/peopleandparties/mem-
bers/germany.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2004)-
121. I'Humanit6, Kosovo: Les Verts Admettent Leurs Nuances (Apr- 13, 1999), available at
http://www.humanite.presse.fr/joumal/1999-04-13/1999-04-13-287588.
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National, emphasizes victimization of the Serbs in Kosovo and asks for
their protection.122
C. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom is receptive to the U.S. pro-independence policy.
However, Lord Lea of Crondall, addressing the House of Lords, mentioned
after the March unrest:
[Although] we have heard criticisms in the press that a contributory fac-
tor in last week's events was that no progress was being made on the fi-
nal status of Kosovo,... our experience in Northern Ireland should be
enough to show that we must be careful to avoid a premature attempt to
define final constitutional status. The key priority must surely be to keep
all the states in the region, including Serbia Montenegro, Albania, Mace-
donia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, in dialogue about the economic
and wider future of the west Balkans. All have an aspiration to join the
European Union.123
The United Kingdom plays an important role in the fight against crime
in the Western Balkans and "presses for full compliance with the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to ensure that
all indicted war criminals are detained and transferred to the Hague to re-
ceive a full hearing and the region confronts its recent past." 124
D. Greece
The official position of the government of Greece is to pursue the
"Standards before Status" approach based on U.N. Resolution 1244
(1999).125 Greece, however, is the best example of how traditional affilia-
tions among European nations can influence national and European poli-
tics. European politics are often tradition based. Not to acknowledge
traditional affiliations and their impact can lead to wrong predictions of
future politics. In the case of Greece it can be assumed that Greece will not
favor the independence of Kosovo, neither in the short nor in the long term.
122. Website of Bruno Gollnisch, available at http://www.gollnisch.com/ (Mar. 30, 2004); Re-
marks of Gollnisch (Nov. 30, 2004) (Debates of European Parliament), available at
http://www3-europarl.eu.int/omk/omnsapir.so/cre?FILE=20040330r&LANGUE=FR&LEVEL=DOC&
NUMINT=2-214&LEG=L5.
123. 659 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 489, available at http://www.publications.parlia-
ment.uk/pa/ldl 99900/ldhansrd/pdvn/ldsO4/text/40322-09.htm#40322-09-spnewl.
124. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Countries and Regions: Western Balkans, available at
http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid= 1007
029394725 (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
125. Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Serbia & Montenegro, available at
http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign-policy/europe_southeasten-/balkans/Yugo.html (last visited Oct. 15,
2004).
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The main reason is that Greece traditionally has been a close ally of Serbia.
There are a number of reasons for that close relationship. One is the so-
called Macedonian question. Throughout the twentieth-century, there have
been several alliances in order to obtain the territory that is currently called
Macedonia. 126 To Greece, Macedonia is still a very controversial issue, as
demonstrated by the controversy over Macedonia's official name.
12 7
Even in the ethnic conflicts of the 1990s, Greece was perceived as bi-
ased in favor of Serbia. Greece was accused of siding with Milosevic's
Serbia during the Bosnia and Kosovo wars 128 and to have scorned the Ser-
bian opposition even until 2000.129 Greece was even accused of siding with
Serbia's darkest sides. 130 During the Kosovo bombings, a near unanimity
of Greeks opposed them. 131 On the other hand, Greece voted for the mili-
tary action against Yugoslavia. As military action by NATO must be taken
unanimously Greece could have vetoed the campaign but refrained from
doing so. At the time of the bombing, however, the Greek government was
the first to call for the suspension of military action and to return to
negotiations. 132
126. In 1912, Bulgaria and Serbia signed a treaty dividing Macedonia, which was under Ottoman
rule. Northern Macedonia was supposed to become Serb, and southern Macedonia Bulgarian. Then
Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece formed an alliance in order to liberate Macedonia from the Ottoman
Empire (the First Balkan War). The Bulgarian army defeated Turkish troops close to Constantinople.
The Greek and Serbian armies occupied Macedonia and divided it among themselves. It is disputed
whether Serbia and Greece managed to keep the land under their control, leaving Bulgaria outside, or if
Bulgaria was dissatisfied with its share and started the Second Balkan war against Serbia. Macedonian
Scientific Institute, Macedonian Question, at http://www.macedoniainfo.com/macedonia/Mace-
donianQuest-ion.htm (last updated Aug. H, 2004).
127 Macedonia's official title is "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia." In the first Balkan
war, Greece gained the territory around the city of Saloniki (Thessaloniki). This northern province is
named Makedonia, which led Greece to oppose the new Macedonian state's bearing of that same name.
INT'L CRISIS GROUP, BALKANS REP. No. 122, MACEDONIA'S NAME: WHY THE DISPUTE MATTERS AND
HOW TO RESOLVE IT 11-14 (Dec. 10, 2001), available at http://www.icg.org//lib-
rary/documents/report-archive/A400507 10122001 .pdf.
128. In a report by a Dutch commission investigating the 1995 Srebrenica massacre, Greece was
revealed to have sent shipments of light arms and ammunition to the Bosnian Serb army between 1994
and 1995. Helena Smith, The Observer, Greece Faces Shame of Role in Serb Massacre (Jan. 5, 2003),
available at http://observer guardian.co.uk/milosevic/story/0, 10639,868869,00 html.
129. Panayote Dimitras, Advocates for Kosova Independence, Book Review: Tals Michas, Unholy
Alliance: Greece and Milosevic's Serbia in the Nineties, available at http://www.alb-
net.com/aki/bookreview/brO2.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
130. Many Greek intellectuals, politicians, journalists, and academics allegedly expressed their
admiration for Karadzic. According to some historians, the media and politicians simply gave in to this
overpowering popular demand. Greek paramilitary fighters had joined Serbian forces in Srebrenica and
even hissed the Greek flag after the capture of the city. After the war, when the Hague tribunal indicted
Karadzic and Mladic, two million signatures were reportedly collected by the Greek-Serbian friendship
association to oppose their prosecution. Id.
131. Id.
132. Joseph Fitchett, NATO Shoots Down 2 Serb MiG-29s over Bosnia, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar.
27, 1999, available at http://www.iht.com/IHT/DlPLO/99/jfD32799.html.
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This alliance between Greece and Serbia is partly attributable to the
Orthodox Church as a nationalist influence common to Greece and Serbia,
one that emphasizes a common ethnicity and anti-Western sentiment. Thus,
in the light of this history, it is most realistic to expect that Greece will not
support the Kosovar claim for independence on its own. Greece will, how-
ever, not prevent a common European position either. The reasons why a
common position in the CFSP is likely to emerge were explained above.
Traditional affiliations will influence a national position for Greece, but
they will probably not present an obstacle for the EU to act. There certainly
may be exceptions, but generally European identity and loyalty towards the
other EU member states drive Greek policy. The vote of Greece for the
bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 supports that claim.
V. METHODS FOR THE EU TO INFLUENCE THE FINAL STATUS
DETERMINATION
What weight does the EU carry to force Serbia and the Kosovar Alba-
nians to come to an agreement? What incentives can it offer and what
threats can it make? How will the EU-independently of what solution it
favors-try to implement its position? There are two main mechanisms the
EU will be able to use. Both are mainly of an economic nature-the eco-
nomic aid the EU provides and the possibility of future accession of the
region into the EU.
First, the EU has the biggest economic share in Kosovo's reconstruc-
tion and future economic development. Whatever political status and form
of government Kosovo will have will depend on economic aid and trade in
order to be a viable polity. Regional economic cooperation will be neces-
sary. Any political solution will not be long-lasting if issues such as eco-
nomic development, unemployment, and reconstruction are not adequately
addressed and solved. This is where the EU can exercise its influence. The
EU is the biggest financial donor for Kosovo. In addition, it is the biggest
trading partner of the province.
The second incentive the EU controls-both positive (a "carrot") and
negative (a "stick")-is the prospect of EU membership for both Serbia and
Kosovo. The EU might try to convince Serbia that an EU membership can
be reached more easily and more quickly if Serbia gets rid of its Kosovo
burden. On the other hand, the EU might or might not offer prospective
membership to Kosovo as an independent state. One might think that in the
long term there will be no difference because both Serbia and Kosovo will
eventually join the EU, either together or as independent states. However,
the current status of Kosovo prevents an EU membership because only
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independent states can join the union. That means that the question of Kos-
ovo has to be solved in order to enable both Serbia and Kosovo to join the
Union. The EU can offer a membership under certain conditions, privi-
leges, and timetables, or it can refrain from doing so. For example, Serbia's
and Kosovo's EU memberships might be combined and tied to each other
in order to force them to cooperate on certain issues.
One might think that an EU membership is not a useful "carrot" for
changing international politics. The example of Cyprus could be cited to
support this claim. The case of Cyprus, however, proves that EU member-
ships work as incentives. The reason why only some regions of Cyprus
joined the EU on May 1, 2004, is not because the "carrot" did not work, but
because it was already given away. In the case of Cyprus, the EU made the
mistake of letting the southern part of the island join regardless of the out-
come of negotiations. That gave the southern part a guaranteed membership
even if it rejected the reunification, which it finally did. That mistake
should not be repeated. The Cyprus example shows, however, that an EU
membership is a huge "carrot" for all participants. The possibility of EU
membership, for the first time, encouraged the northern part of the island,
as well as Turkey, to engage in serious negotiations and even led to the
approval of a referendum. The problem was that the Union had given away
its "carrot" for the South.
The "carrot" of EU membership faces a number of problems, though.
The first one is whether national politicians really want that accession. In
the elections in Serbia on December 28, 2003, pro-Western parties were
defeated, and nationalistic parties prevailed. 133 The new Serbian govern-
ment might simply not desire that Serbia become an EU member. Simi-
larly, Kosovars might not be willing to give up sovereignty after a short
period of independence after decision making was dominated by intema-
tionals for many years. However, national politics will face the dynamic of
a region that is heading towards European integration. Slovenia joined the
Union on May 1, 2004.134 Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia are to follow in
the years to come. 135 Macedonia has applied for EU membership. 136
133. lan Traynor, Serbian Election Victory for War Crimes Suspect's Party (Dec. 29, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.iht.com/lHT/DIPLO/99/jf032799.html. The main winner of the elections was the
Serbian Radical Party. Id. The Serbian Radical Party is led by Vojislav Seselj, who is awaiting trial at
the war crimes tribunal in The Hague. Id,
134. European Commission, supra note 2.
135. See European Commission, Enlargement, at http://www.europa.eu.intjabc/index en.hnn# (last
visited Oct. 15, 2004).
136. Croatia applied for EU membership on February 21, 2003. European Commission, The EU's
Relations with Croatia, at http://europa.cu.int/comm/extemalrelations/see/croatia/index.htm (last
updated June 2003). Macedonia applied for EU membership on March 22, 2004. Irish Presidency 2004
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A second problem that the EU membership "carrot" faces is that insti-
tutional reform of the Union needs to progress. In that regard, the EU con-
stitution plays a decisive role. 137 Currently, the Treaty of Nice governs the
Union of twenty-five member states; it came into force on February 1,
2003.138 In December 2003, the European Council wanted to adopt a new
treaty: the European Constitution. 139 The adoption failed, however, because
Poland and Spain did not agree with the newly weighted voting rights that
would reduce their influence in the Council of Ministers, as compared to
the voting rights that they enjoyed under the Treaty of Nice. 140 Since then,
the Polish and Spanish governments have changed their positions, but new
uncertainties have arisen from decisions to submit the EU constitution to
referenda in some member states. 14 1 Superficially, the consequences for
Kosovo do not seem imminent, as Kosovo neither enjoys statehood nor
fulfills the political and economic conditions for membership. However, a
of the European Union, President of the European Council Formally Accepts Macedonian Application
for Membership in the EU (Mar. 22, 2004), at http://www.eu2004.ie/templates/news.asp?sNav-
locator66&listid-443.
137. The entity of the EU is a treaty-based organization. Its fundament, the Treaty of Rome of
1958, established two of the three European communities: the European Economic Community (EEC,
later called the EC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC) had already been established in 1951. The original treaties have been altered
over time through the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice. The treaties establish the European
institutions, the rights of European citizens, the mechanisms for cooperation among the European
member states, and more. European Commission, supra note 2.
138. Id.
139. In December 2001, the European Council, during its summit in Lacken, Belgium, mandated a
European Convention to elaborate a draft treaty establishing a constitution for the EU. The draft treaty
was presented in July 2003 and included the following main features: (1) reorganization of the existing
treaties and changes to the overall structure of the EU; (2) increased role of the European Parliament;
(3) incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights; (4) changes in the institutions of the EU, espe-
cially the creation of a permanent President of the EU, the creation of a Foreign Minister of the EU, and
a reduced number of commissioners, and (5) changes in the voting rights in the Council of Ministers (as
compared to the voting rights in the Treaty of Nice). European Convention, Report from the Presidency
of the Convention to the President of the European Council 3 5 (July 18, 2003), available at
http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00851 .enO3.pdf.
140. Under the Treaty of Nice, both Poland and Spain have twenty-seven votes each, only two less
than much more populous nations like France and Germany. Deutsche Welle, EU Constitution Summit
Fails (Dec. 13, 2003), at http://www.dw-world-de/english/O,3367,1433_A_1059815_1 _A,00.html.
141. After the election of a new Spanish government on March 14, 2004, Spain changed its posi-
tion on the EU constitution. In addition, a new proposal for'another form of double majority in the
voting mechanism makes the adoption of the constitution more likely. The new provision would pro-
vide that instead of half (13/25) of the member states representing 60% of the population, 55% (14/25)
of the states would represent 65% of the population. Christian Wemicke, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, Irland
will die EU-Verfassung Retten [Ireland Wants to Save the EU Constitution], available at
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/aus-land/artikel/968/30938/ (Apr. 28, 2004). On April 21, 2004, the Prime
Minister of Great Britain, Tony Blair, declared that he was submitting the EU Constitution to a referen-
dum in the United Kingdom, making the chances for its realization unclear again. Christoph
Schwennicke & Alexander Hageloiken, Sfiddeutsche Zeitung, Tony Blair Sezt die EU-Verfassung aufs
Spiel [Tony Blair Jeopardizes the EU Constitution] (Apr. 19, 2004), available at http://www.sued-
deutsche.de/ausland/artikeL'419/30389/.
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failed EU constitution can have a substantial impact on Kosovo's future.
The impact can occur in two forms: (1) on Kosovo's ability to become an
EU member, whether as an independent entity or as part of Serbia and
Montenegro; and (2) on Kosovo's final status.
The first possibility is that the EU would not be able to accept new
members for a long time. The EU constitution was supposed to prepare the
EU for twenty-five and more members. The current Treaty of Nice has a
voting mechanism that includes Bulgaria and Romania. 142 Any further
enlargement will require a change in the voting mechanism, as it will have
to be determined how many votes each new member state will have. Thus,
Kosovo's prospective EU membership, whether as an independent country
or as part of Serbia and Montenegro, is subject to the EU's ability to make
further reforms. Any new enlargement will raise the question of how voting
rights should be weighted. Without an agreement on the EU constitution,
any other agreement on enlargement seems impossible.
The uncertainty of the EU's own status affects its ability to influence
the final status of Kosovo. If the EU cannot successfully reorganize itself to
allow for the acceptance of new members, it cannot offer membership to
Serbia as an incentive for Serbia's acceptance of the independence of Kos-
ovo. Likely, there will simply be too little for Serbia to gain in letting Kos-
ovo go. The inability of the EU to structure further enlargement will
diminish its influence on Kosovo's final status determination.
CONCLUSION
Although the March 2004 unrests put Kosovo back on the top of the
EU's agenda, they certainly did not enhance the prospects of Kosovo's
independence. The EU, in determining its policy toward Kosovo, should
evaluate whether the cause of the March 2004 unrests was recurrent ethnic
tensions or dissatisfaction with UNMIK.
Ultimately, EU member states will not be split on the issue of the final
status for Kosovo. In the short term, because the EU does not want to re-
ward the violence, it will not favor independence for Kosovo. In the long
term, the EU likely will prefer conditional independence. The EU will
value minority protection as the key indicator of democratization. It is clear
that without efficient protection of the Serb minority in Kosovo, independ-
ence will not be granted.
142. European Commission, Treaty of Nice: A Comprehensive Guide, Institutional Questions,
available at http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/nice treaty/council_en.htm#VOTES (last visited Oct.
15, 2004).
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Which status it is going to be is very difficult to predict. The Serbian
idea to split Kosovo will probably receive least support. The idea of con-
ditional independence, which the Independent Commission on Kosovo
has launched some time ago, looks the most feasible. Independence
would then be made dependent upon the protection of minorities, aban-
doning any Greater Albanian projects, condemnation of any violence,
and regional cooperation. Because of the past and realities on the ground
(also created by UNMIK), integration of Kosovo back into Serbia
doesn't seem an option.14
3
143. E-mail interview with Ute Seela, supra note 27.
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